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approaches. When treated as two distinct variables, they are responsible for the creation of a framework of 
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of determinism, hard incompatibilism, libertarianism and compatibilism, each perspective characterized by 
different amounts of strategic choice and determinism. By drawing on the theoretical context of the 
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1 Introduction 
If we consider organizational management, we quickly realize that, although there are many theories that attempt 
to explain how management’s choices can affect organizational performance, the quest for a comprehensive 
theory of management (Bourgeois 1984; De Rond and Thietart 2007; Joullié 2018), which began in the first 
decades of the 20th century, is far from over. 
This paper sheds some light, both at a theoretical and at an empirical level, on why existing management 
theories are both so fragmented and so limited in their validity, and why it proves so elusive to identify a single 
theory of management, and presents the reasons for the difficulties in framing management-related dynamics, thus 
helping to increase management’s decision reliability and predictability. 
Our physical world appears both undetermined on the smallest scale, as posited by quantum mechanics – see 
for instance Heisenberg (1926) – and determined and orderly where the traditional laws of physics are manifested. 
In a similar fashion, our social reality may appear totally undetermined – when we look at the erratic movements 
that take place from time to time on the stock exchange – or determined – as in when we buy and sell government 
bonds or are able to regularly buy groceries in the supermarket across the road. In the above contexts, the 
difference between what is determined and what is undetermined largely depends on what we are looking at and 
on how we look at it. 
Although these premises may, on the one hand, be looked upon as discouraging factors in finding an 
explanation for such contrasting aspects of our everyday lives, on the other hand, the philosophical study of what 
is determined or undetermined and of the role that free will may play in it may have a profound impact on the way 
we see our world and the way we behave and make choices in our everyday lives. 
This paper aims to highlight the contrasting philosophical stances that originate from free will and determinism 
in mapping the human agent’s operational space, as well as to provide a framework that will be able to be used 
effectively in the realm of strategic management. In this direction, we provide for the first time novel empirical 
evidence on the real-life existence of the ontological perspectives in which it is possible to position each 
organization, by identifying how much the organization relies on strategic choice and/or determinism. 
In the first part of the paper, we highlight the links between human agency, free will and determinism, and 
strategic management choices and socio-economic determinism. We then proceed to develop the strategic choice 
determinism framework, which is composed of four different perspectives, and describe the features of each of 
them. Next, we engage in the empirical analysis in the context of the real-life existence of this framework. A 
discussion of the results and the respective theoretical and empirical implications of the strategic choice 
determinism framework takes place, after which we provide some concluding remarks. 
 
2  Theoretical background 
The strategic management literature presents us with two main approaches to planning: determinism and strategic 
choice (Bourgeois 1984; Thompson 1967; Child 1972). It therefore appears important that we look for a single 
framework offering the possibility of linking these two opposing approaches to planning and the theories they 
generate. 
Determinism, which consists of applying the laws ruling the external environment to predict external 
environment dynamics and organizational performance, produces theories, frameworks or laws such as industry 
structure, technological processes, size and ownership, product life cycle, market share, power of supplier and 
buyers, and mobility barriers (Bourgeois 1984). According to Bourgeois (1984), deterministic planning also 
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consists of a reaction to contingent organizational, external-environment conditions; as a result, managers’ 
behaviour is explained through contingency theory.  
Similarly, strategic choice can be used, in contrast to deterministic planning, to influence and shape the 
external environment by setting strategic goals, choosing a specific field of activity, and selecting both a 
technology and an organizational structure (Bourgeois 1984; Child 1972). 
Table 1 summarizes what distinguishes deterministic from strategic-choice-based planning.  
 
Table 1  Differences between deterministic and strategic-choice-based planning 






• Social reality actors make choices from the 
causal background, following existing rules 
and preset behavioural patterns, to foresee and 
reach their goals (De Rond and Thietart 2007). 
• Actions are carried out as a reaction to some 
external environment (causal environment) 
conditions, complying with existing laws and 
regulations. 
• Decision making makes use of statistics, and 
utilizes existing technology, infrastructure, 
brands, resources etc. 
• Easier to foresee or determine a 
course of action 
• Constrained by what exists 
(Bourgeois 1984) 
• More likely to face competition  
• Management control system 
through diagnostic control 
(Simons 1991) 
• Risk management based on 










• Social reality actors act out of pre-set schemes, 
in such a way as to influence and mould the 
external environment by creating new laws, 
regulations, new technology, new brands, 
resources etc.  
• Social actors modify or build something new 
starting from what exists. 
• Has historically produced highest 
levels of performance (Child 
1972) 
• More difficult to 
create/implement (Child 1972) 
• Reduces competition 
• Management control system 
through an interactive control 
system (Simons 1991) 
• Risk management based on 
reducing the likelihood of 
something happening. ISO 31000 
(2009) 
 
The dichotomy between deterministic and strategic-choice-based planning, described above, was overcome 
by De Rond and Thietart’s (2007) view of strategy creation, according to which determinism, choice and chance 
have a clearly defined, synergic and non-conflicting role in strategy creation. 
According to De Rond and Thietart (2007), social actors operate within what exists or what has been socially 
constructed up to the present day, or the causal background, consisting of contextual variables, which include 
agent-specific states or manager idiosyncrasies (habit, know-how, experience, age, education, ideology and 
systemic rationality), as well as more general social states (institutions, social structures, the properties of markets 
and industries, the evolving state of technology and the economy, the features of the social world).  
Strategy is produced, as shown in Figure 1, by managers’ choices, for which they become responsible, against 
the causal background, with the interplay of chance (De Rond and Thietart 2007).  
 
Fig. 1  The causal background within which choice and chance produce strategy 
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Within this context, causation can be referred to as the managers’ choices as opposed to the mechanistic 
causality principle known in the natural world. Empirical evidence of the existence the causal background is 
provided by Pucheta-Martínez, Gallego-Álvarez  (2019), Jost  (2013), Shwairef et al. (2019) and Yoon et al. 
(2016), according to whom managers’ idiosyncrasies and board composition influence boards’ behaviour and 
ultimately organizational performance. 
 
2.1  Human Agency, Strategic Choice and Determinism 
 
To take a step forward in understanding the meaning and implications of strategic choice, determinism and chance 
for strategic management, and identify a framework that could more comprehensively link the two planning 
approaches, it is important to analyse the human agency field and the perspectives generated by all the possible 
combinations of the two philosophical principles of free will and determinism, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Fig. 2  Perspectives generated by free will and determinism 
 
It can be noted that the combination of free will and determinism produces two distinct conditions, one in 
which determinism or free will or both are not true and therefore are incompatible, and another in which both 
determinism and free will are true and possible and are, therefore, compatible. 
 
2.2   Incompatibilism and compatibilism 
 
Within incompatibilism, there is a dichotomy between free will and determinism, which generates three possible 
views: (a) determinism, in which only determinism exists and it is denied that any free will exists, (b) hard 
incompatibilism, which denies both that the physical world is determined and that free will exists, and (c) 
libertarianism,1 which denies that the universe is deterministic and states that only free will exists (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy(a), 2018). 
Opposite to the incompatibilist stance, there is compatibilism (or soft determinism), which is the belief that 
determinism and free will are compatible conditions and that it is coherent to believe that both conditions can 
coexist (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(b), 2018; De Rond and Thietart 2007). 
The respective distinctive features of these philosophical perspectives can, at first, help explain different kinds 
of human agent causation and responsibility, which ultimately influence the way the human agent behaves. An 
agent’s behaviour, when he/she is looked at as a manager, will help to understand causation and responsibility, 
which respectively explain and affect managerial behaviour, and ultimately strategy creation. 
 
1 Libertarianism also describes a collection of political philosophies and movements that uphold liberty as a core principle. 
Although free will and independence of judgement are shared with the economic and management libertarianism to which this 
paper refers, the former political libertarianism is not directly related to the arguments of this paper. 
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In the strategic management literature, Astley and Van de Ven (1983) and Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) 
respectively present a framework of the main organizational theories and environmental adaptation, according to 
which organizations adapt to the external environment, according to the different uses they make of strategic 
choice and determinism. Although each of these frameworks is composed of four perspectives, which share most 
of the features of the four human agency philosophical perspectives of determinism, hard incompatibilism, 
libertarianism and compatibilism, these authors did not highlight the existence of a link between strategic 
management and human agency. 
Table 2 presents the common features, which suggest a connection, between free will and determinism in 
human agency, and strategic choice and socio-economic determinism in organizational theory and organizational 
adaptation. 
 






Astley & Van de Ven (1983) 
Organizational adaptation 
Hrebiniak & Joyce (1985) 
Name:  Determinism System structural Environmental selection 
Choice  No choice available Determined, constrained and 
adaptive 
Minimum choice  
Features/Theories Reality is determined System theory, structural 
functionalism and 
contingency theory 
Adaptation or selection out 
Level of innovation: low 
Responsibility No responsibility Limited to the ability to know 
or respond to the environment 
dynamics 
Limited to the ability to 




The agent has no 
power 
Manager role is reactive  
    
Name:  Hard incompatibilism Natural selection Undifferentiated choice 
Choice: No choice available Random, natural or economic Incremental choice  
Features Reality is 
undetermined 
Population ecology, industrial 
economics, economic history 
Adaptation by chance 
Level of innovation is low 
Responsibility No responsibility Little or no responsibility Little or no responsibility 
Power and 
control 
The agent has no 
power 
Manager role: inactive  
    
Name:  Libertarianism Strategic choice Strategic choice 
Choice: Maximum choice Constructed, autonomous and 
enacted 
Maximum choice 
Features Reality is 
undetermined 
Action theory, contemporary 
decision theory, strategic 
management 
Adaptation by design 
Level of innovation is high 
Responsibility Maximum 
responsibility 
Responsibility to influence 





The agent has power Manager role is proactive  
    
Name:  Compatibilism Collective action Differentiation or focus 
Choice: Some choice Responsible, collectively 
constructed 
Differentiated choice 
Features Reality is partly 
determined and partly 
undetermined 
Human ecology, political 
economy, pluralism 
Adaptation with constraints 
Level of innovation is 
medium 
Responsibility Some responsibility Responsibility to both know 
and react to the organizational 
context and alter it 
Responsibility to both know 
and react to the 




The agent has some 
power 
Manager role is interactive  
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In this context, essential elements to the understanding of the dynamics, which explain how organizations 
originate and move from one perspective to another, and the mechanisms which make companies behave 
differently within any of the four different previously presented perspectives, can be traced in the theories of 
organizational path dependence, of Sydow et al. (2009), and that of imprinting, of Marquis and Tilcsik (2013). 
More specifically, path dependence is the outcome of one or more random events which occur during the 
organizational life. These events create a path onto which organizations lock in, and on which they become 
dependent in order to produce performance, hence constantly reducing the importance of management. 
Path dependence occurs in three phases (see Figure 3): During Phase I, the organization is presented with many 
choices and options; in Phase II, an organizational path emerges thanks to a critical event, which catalyses 
organizational activities towards a specific direction or favour of choice; in Phase III, the organization locks onto 
the path and becomes dependent on it in order to produce performance. 
 
 
Fig. 3   The constitution of an organizational path (Sydow et al. 2009) 
 
Although Sydow et al. (2009) mainly focus on the particular organizational path that is activated by a random 
event and becomes determined after the lock-in phase, in their paper they also acknowledge that the “path can 
actually be broken” (p.703) as well as that “the path can be deliberately brought about” (p.705) in addition to 




Fig. 4  Possible organizational paths and imprinting cases in the human agency perspectives 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how paths can be generated, according to the organizational path theory, and move from 
one to another of the four different human agency perspectives.  
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Marquis and Tilcsik’s (2013)2 imprinting consists of the exposure of the “focal entity” to a pre-existing 
situation for a short period of time, while he/she is particularly sensitive to the influence of the external 
environment, producing long-lasting effects on his/her future behaviour. Imprinting not only occurs within the 
animal kingdom, where it was first observed, but also within organizations, which, through imprinting, tend to 
shape their structure to reflect the environment in which they operate. 
In so far as whether the path dependence theory explains how a company positions itself in a specific 
perspective, Marquis and Tilcsik’s (2013) imprinting theory presents a deterministic view of the socio-economic 
environment, in which long-lasting existing structures are replicated in the future to determine our present reality, 
thus deterministically allowing us, with the knowledge of the past, to foresee future events. Although Marquis 
and Tilcsik (2013) maintain that imprinting is a deterministic theory because it suggests that the existing structure 
mechanistically replicates itself in the future, they overlook the fact that chance may play a role during the initial 
imprinting period in exposing the “focal entity” to one particular set of socio-economic conditions rather than 
another. Both chance and management choices play a role in creating multiple sensitive periods during the 
transformation phases of the organizational life, and management choices may play a role in imprinting decay, in 
which the initial imprinting fades to bring change and something new into the conditions, which are no longer 
determined or stable after the initial imprinting. The aforementioned diverse features of imprinting allow even 
Marquis and Tilcsik’s (2013) imprinting theory to be related to the human agency perspectives presented earlier, 
as shown in Table 3, which demonstrates how both imprinting and organizational path theory refer to those four 
theoretical perspectives of determinism, hard incompatibilism, libertarianism and compatibilism. 
 
Table 3   Features of imprinting and organizational path theory 





there is no 
strategic choice 
Imprinting - through which existing 
structures replicate themselves in a pre-
set way - relates to the deterministic 
perspective and explains why the external 
environment is determined and why 
organizations have little or no choice.  
In this environment, organizations can only 
reach the lock-in phase as it would be 
difficult to imagine the beginning of a path, 
which according to Sydow et al. (2009) 
originates from either a random event, 
typical of the hard incompatibilist 
perspective, or a free will event, typical of 




There is little or 
no strategic choice 
Imprinting, in which the initial conditions 
are randomly presented to the focal entity, 
relates to the hard incompatibilist 
environment, in which the external 
environment is undetermined and there is 
little or no choice. 
In this environment, a random event 
originates the organizational path, the lock-
in phase of which may take place in any of 
the determinist or compatibilist perspectives 







choice at its 
disposal 
Imprint decay, which occurs to create a 
new condition which did not exist before, 
can be traced in the libertarian 
environment, where the external socio-
economic environment is undetermined 
while management has choice at its 
disposal. 
The path is initiated by the management’s 
choices and the lock-in phase may happen in 
either the deterministic or the compatibilist 
perspective (see Figure 4). Organizations 
which operate in the libertarian perspective 
cannot tolerate any inefficiency, never really 
follow a set path as happens with the use of 
strategic choice, continuously lock onto a 
path and exit from it by breaking it, so as to 
remain competitive in an undetermined and 




is only partly 
determined 
Imprinting in multiple sensitive periods, 
which explains how the changing of 
something determined occurs - can be 
associated with the compatibilist 
environment, according to which a 
determined external socio-economic 
environment can be changed by choice. 
The path that was originated in the hard 
incompatibilist or libertarian environment 
reaches the first lock-in phase, which is 
followed by a series of breakings of the path 
and successive new lock-ins, which take 
place thanks to the strategic choice at the 
management’s disposal. 
 
2 Marquis and Tilcsik (2013) advance a three-part definition of imprinting that emphasizes (1) brief sensitive periods of 
transition during which the focal entity exhibits high susceptibility to external influences; (2) a process whereby the focal 
entity comes to reflect elements of its environment during a sensitive period; and (3) the persistence of imprints despite 
subsequent environmental changes. 
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Table 3 allows us to relate imprinting, in each of the perspectives of the strategic choice determinism 
framework, to a phase of the organizational path theory, thus suggesting that the two theories could be part of a 
greater theory that explains how organizations originate and move from one perspective to another, although 
Marquis and Tilcsik (2013) present a more limited view of imprinting.  
 
3   The strategic choice determinism conceptual framework 
 
According to the human agency literature, which also encompasses strategic management, the ontological 
perspectives of determinism, hard incompatibilism, libertarianism and compatibilism possess the following main 
features: 
 
3.1 Determinism  
 
From a philosophical standpoint, a deterministic view of reality implies that knowledge of the past and of the laws 
that rule the natural world is sufficient to determine the future, as every event in nature happens because of the 
deterministic causation inherent in the laws of the physical world.  
This implies that the human agent is not responsible for her actions due to the absence of the agent’s choice. 
When limiting our analysis to strategic management, within the deterministic organizational structure, the roles 
and positions are hierarchically arranged so as to efficiently achieve the function of the system, and change takes 
place through the dividing and integrating of roles so as to adapt the organization’s subsystems to changes in the 
environment, by means of technology, size and resource needs. Organizational behaviour is determined, 
constrained and adaptive, managers’ roles are reactive, and change happens inside organizations in response to 
the external environment (Astley and Van de Ven 1983). 
According to additional deterministic theories, companies mechanistically produce organizational 
performance, by possessing and exploiting assets, be they tangible or intangible such as Penrose’s, (1959) 
Resource Based View of the firm (RBV) or by achieving a competitive advantage through the use of resources, 
to create entry barriers, such as Porter’s (1981) five forces framework. 
In the deterministic environment, managers obtain managerial effectiveness through the application of 
scientific laws or principles, be they laws of organization or laws of the marketplace Bourgeois (1984) or, as 
posited by Montanari (1979), organizational performance is achieved through the company’s size, which is 
moderated by technology and managerial choices. According to structural determinism, companies create an 
internal structure to take advantage of market needs and dynamics and thereby produce performance, whose 
causation should be identified with the use of inferential statistics (Donaldson, 1987, 1997, 2005). 
Further more Sydow et al. (2009), argues that the organizational path, which was originated by either a random 
event or an act of will, reaches the lock-in phase and Marquis and Tilcsik’s (2013) imprinting theory explains how 
organizations produce performance mechanistically. In this context, Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) maintain that, 
within the deterministic perspective the market competition3 intensity is very strong and organizations have 
minimal choice, therefore either adapt, by knowing and respecting the rules of the markets or are selected out.  
In the deterministic perspective, organizational outcomes are obtained by knowing and exploiting the system 
or responding to the contingencies presented by the organizational context.  
 
3.2  Hard incompatibilism 
 
From a philosophical stance, the outcomes of the agent’s decisions, which he/she makes in an undetermined 
external reality, are affected by chance or luck (Haji, 2000). The human agent is, therefore, not responsible for 
his/her actions. 
Narrowing our interest to strategic management, in this environment, managers’ responsibility is almost non-
existent, in determining the organizational outcomes, as things happen in the external environment by chance or 
luck. According to Astley and Van de Ven (1983), managers’ behaviour is inactive and they have no power or 
control over the external environment. 
The main planning theories are as follows: scenario planning, on the basis of which organizations deal with 
uncertainty by preparing to face a number of random external conditions the organizational context could present 
(Wack 1985); chaos theory, which foresees that difficult to forecast, small environmental changes occur 
constantly over time and may produce future unpredictable effects whose dynamics are difficult to control (Astley 
and Van de Ven, 1983); organizational failure, which, according to Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004), consists of 
the deterioration in an organization’s adaptation to its microniche and the associated reduction of resources within 
 
3 When we refer to competition in each of the examined perspectives we consider the B2B, (B2) B2C or 
prosumers2B2prosumers competition. 
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the organization; and finally, population ecology, which posits that the intractable macro-environmental 
conditions that operate in an industry determine the limits within which industry members can operate (Astley 
and Van de Ven 1983).  
According to Sydow et al. (2009), the organizational path is started by a random event, which, as explained 
by Marquis and Tilcsik’s (2013) imprinting theory, could be explained by the influence this random event has on 
the sensitive “focal entity”. Finally, for Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985), in the hard incompatibilist perspective market 
competition intensity is inconsistent as chance can produce either low or high barriers to entry, which subjects 
organizations to adaptation by chance and natural selection. 
In the hard incompatibilist perspective, organizational outcomes are uncertain and either greatly 
advantageous to organizations, in the case of found opportunity, or disastrous in the case that 
unknown/unmanaged risk produces undesired outcomes. 
 
3.3  Libertarianism  
 
From a philosophical standpoint, the concept of freewill implies that the agent’s free decisions determine the 
world in which he/she lives (Kane, 1999). Narrowing our focus to strategic management, managers act according 
to the strategic choice at their disposal. They have power over the external environment and their responsibility is 
high as they create the laws that rule the external environment in determining organizational outcomes (Astley 
and Van de Ven, 1983) by (a) setting strategic goals, (b) choosing a specific field of activity, and selecting both 
(c) a technology and (d) an organizational structure (Child 1972). 
Regarding these first two organizational activities, Varadarajan et al. (1992) propose two categories of 
strategic activity; the first is meant to stimulate something existing within the external environment and the second 
to create macro-environmental change favourable to the organization through the creation of something new, to 
the organization’s advantage, thus establishing a link between strategic choice and innovation (Silverman, 1970; 
Varadarajan et al. 1992). 
Also Schumpeter (1911)’s Mark I theory, according to which industries develop through the continuous 
creation of new ways to provide products and services, which, as Fontana et al. (2012) point out, takes place in 
an uncertain and turbulent environment even at the cost of destroying what exists, refers to the libertarian 
environment. 
Sydow et al. (2009)’s organizational path theory maintains that, in the libertarian undetermined environment, 
the path is initiated by the choices of the organization’s management, the lock-in phase of which may happen in 
either the deterministic or compatibilist perspective and the breaking of the path and the initiation of a new path 
can be explained by imprint decay, which occurs so as to create a new condition which did not exist before 
(Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). 
In the libertarian perspective according to action theory, organizations, within the libertarian perspective, are 
continuously constructed, sustained and changed by managers through the use of strategic choice (Astley and Van 
de Ven, 1983), which managers use to reduce market competition intensity as market barriers to entry are 
constantly circumvented by the introduction of new products and services; therefore in consideration of the 
maximum amount of choice available to management in the libertarian perspective, adaptation happens by design 
(Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985). Voigt (2011) and Christensen and Raynor (2003) by defining new products and 
services, brought to market in the libertarian perspective, as “new-market disruptions” describe their revolutionary 
impact on the external environment. 
In view of the above, in the libertarian perspective, organizational outcomes are obtained through the creation 
of something new, to the organization’s advantage, through the use of strategic choice. 
 
3.4  Compatibilism  
 
From a philosophical perspective, the world is partly determined and the human agent can choose or change some 
aspects of it, becoming responsible for the choices he/she makes. 
Whittington (1988, 2010), grounding his work on Giddens’(1984) structuration theory, which conforms to 
Bhaskar (1989)’s and Bourdieu’s (1988) critical realism, posits that human social activity is characterized by a 
pre-existing structure which is essential to the existence of agency, which in turn is available to each individual 
who plays a role within a structure. Gidden’s (1984) structuration theory, however, proposes that individuals, 
when acting as agents, not only participate and conform to social structures (i.e. family, work and policy) but also 
have the ability to change them. In this context, Leca and Naccache (2006) add that institutional actors not only 
comply with pre-existing laws and structures but also have the ability to act as agents who possess the power to 
alter, by procuring change from within, the deterministic, pre-set institutional structures in which they operate. 
Focusing our interest on strategic management, managers’ behaviour is interactive, collectively constructed 
and politically negotiated (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). Managers have limited power and control over the 
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external environment, which is ruled by laws that are independent of the organization, but they have the possibility 
to alter those laws.  
Managers’ responsibility, in determining organizational outcomes, is both limited by their choice of the 
deterministic theories that explain the external environment and open to change in the external environment. 
Sarasvathy’s (2001) effectuation, with which management determines new and sometimes unexpected 
objectives, starting from the available means, in contrast to deterministic causation, under which the means are 
determined so as to obtain the objectives, constitutes the mechanism according to which things happen in the 
compatibilist perspective. Schumpeter’s (1942) Mark II theory, whose industries are characterized by stable 
environments with relatively high entry barriers, in which innovations are generated and developed by large 
established firms (Fontana et al. 2012), presents the features of the compatibilist environment, in which 
technological competition assumes the form of creative accumulation, with incumbent firms introducing 
innovations by means of a process of consolidation of their technological capabilities (Malerba 2005, p.382), thus 
growing and developing what exists. 
In	the	compatibilist	environment,	companies	which	use	product	platforms	or	collections	of	modules	or	
parts	that	are	common	to	a	number	of	products,	intentionally	developed	to	create	customer	value	constantly	
modify	them	as described by Harland et al. (2020) to sustain organizational performance. According to Sydow 
et al.’s (2009) organizational path theory, in the compatibilist, partly determined environment, the path that was 
originated in the hard incompatibilist or libertarian environment reaches the first lock-in phase, which is followed 
by a series of breakings of the path and successive new lock-ins, which in turn can be explained through the 
occurrence of Marquis and Tilcsik’s (2013) imprinting in multiple sensitive periods as necessary to obtain change 
in something determined. 
Companies which are presented with both environmental determinism and differentiated choice, adapt with 
constraints, through the use of strategic choice, to the external environment (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985), in which 
market competition intensity is strong, and companies protect their businesses by both erecting barriers to entry 
and at the same time creating new products and services. In this context, Voigt (2011) and Christensen and Raynor 
(2003) by defining new ways to bring existing products and services to market, in the compatibilist perspective, 
as low-end disruptions describe their moderate impact on the external environment. 
As such, in the compatibilist perspective, organizational outcomes are obtained through exploitation of the 
system and/or, through the use of strategic choice, the incremental growing, improving or constructing of what 
exists.  
The theoretical considerations presented above allow us to create the strategic choice determinism framework, in 
which the two independent variables of strategic choice and determinism create a space composed of the four 




Fig. 5  The strategic choice determinism framework 
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An ontological perspective of the strategic choice/determinism framework shown in Figure 5 refers to each of 
the quadrants generated by the variables of strategic choice and determinism. Each perspective refers to a 
particular organizational context, which encompasses both organizations’ internal and external environments 
possessing the features of a particular ontological perspective. Therefore, in the continuation of this paper, the 
terms environment or industry, and organizational structure, refer respectively to the ontological perspectives’ 
external and internal environments, be they deterministic, hard incompatibilist, libertarian or compatibilist. Each 
perspective allows us to look at and appreciate specific empirical situations or environments. 
A perspective of the strategic choice determinism framework can be described as what you would see if you 
wore glasses with lenses of a particular colour. In the physical world, the separation of the primary colours, red, 
green and blue, allows us to obtain an image constituted of colour components. Similarly, each perspective of the 
strategic choice determinism framework identifies one component of the whole socio-economic reality, just as the 
combination of red, green and blue allows one to analyse and recreate all the colours and shades of an image. 
Theories which apply to a particular perspective (some apply to one or more than one environment) are valid 
for a particular combination of strategic choice and determinism, typical of the environment or managerial 




4  Empirical evidence of the framework’s real-life existence 
To empirically test the real-life existence of the ontological perspectives that compose the strategic choice 
determinism framework, it is imperative that an appropriate framework of analysis is developed.  
In this direction, we consider (a) creation through theoretical sampling, used for the analysis of each studied 
ontological perspective, of a sample of companies, which will be quantitatively studied by (b) investigating the 
existence of correlations and (c) conducting a longitudinal regression between financial-statement-derived 
variables indicative of companies’ performance and variables being chosen to represent a strategic choice or 
deterministic approach to strategy. 
 
4.1  Theoretical sampling and data sample creation 
 
By identifying the features that each ontological perspective of the theoretical framework presented above 
possesses in the real world, it is possible to identify real-life industries possessing those features. The sample of 
companies from these industries, representative of a particular ontological perspective, can then be quantitatively 
analysed to look for any relationship between management’s reliance on strategic choice or determinism, and 
organizational outcomes. 
To identify the real-life features of each ontological perspective, we should think of the whole socio-economic 
world as something that can initially be divided into two perspectives: a deterministic environment (top-left box 
of the framework), in which companies do not rely heavily on strategic choice and are expected to operate in a 
deterministic or contingent way, and a hard incompatibilist environment (bottom-left box of the framework), in 
which companies operate in an uncertain or undetermined socio-economic environment without relying on 
strategic choice. 
From each of these two perspectives, it is possible to derive two additional perspectives by considering those 
companies which use strategic choice to produce organizational performance.  
Thus, starting from the previously described determined and undetermined real-life environments, by 
identifying the strategic choice component available to managers within each of the two environments (Astley 
and Van de Ven 1983; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; Hrebiniak and Joyce 1984; Kane 1999), the compatibilist 
and libertarian ontological perspectives can be identified. 
The industries which utilize a component of strategic choice in the way they plan and operate in a stable or 
determined socio-economic environment will be considered to operate in a compatibilist way (top-right box of 
the framework), while the industries which operate in an uncertain environment, which utilize strategic choice as 
a main feature of planning, will be considered to operate according to the libertarian ontological perspective 
(bottom-right corner of the framework). 
Figure 6 presents the real-life features of each perspective and suggests some real-life business environments 




Fig. 6  Features of real-life socio-economic ontological perspectives, and the companies and industries that 
operate in them 
 
4.1.1  Companies representative of the deterministic environment 
 
Looking at the deterministic environment it is possible to see that Figure 6 identifies the following real-life 
industries: insurance, banking and pension fund. For the purpose of our study it is worth noting that Zajac et al 
(2000) analyse, over a nine-year period, a sample of over 4,000 companies operating in the savings and loan 
industry, which, according to our theoretical sampling method, is a deterministic industry, and provide evidence 
that companies operating in a deterministic perspective, such as those in the savings and loan industry (S&L), 
produce positive organizational performance only by acting deterministically. Zajac et al.’s (2000) work, 
therefore, produces empirical evidence of the real-life existence of the deterministic ontological perspective. 
 
4.1.2 Companies representative of the hard incompatibilist environment 
 
Although it is difficult to exactly point out hard incompatibilist industries, as any company can enter this 
environment due to either epistemic endogenous factors (management’s lack of competencies and/or knowledge 
(Tversky, and Kahneman 1974)) or exogenous factors such as an industry undergoing sudden change, we are 
going to provide some examples that indicate the real life existence of this ontological perspective. For instance 
the creation of Pfizer’s Viagra, which only by pure chance became the famous and extremely lucrative drug it did 
for Pfizer, emerging when the company was looking for a cure for angina (De Rond and Thietart 2007) or 
conventional photography market being adversely affected, in the years 2000, by the introduction of digital 
cameras and the Internet. 
In addition, Fitza (2013), in a study of 25,859 companies sampled from several business environments, found 
that CEOs’ choices produce random results in terms of companies’ performance Fitza (2017). One explanation of 
this finding could be the existence of different ontological perspectives, one being hard incompatibilism. 
Although these empirical indications from the literature suggest the real-life existence of the hard 
incompatibilist ontological perspective, it would be difficult to apply the research methodology presented later in 
this paper, which correlates and regresses companies’ ratios, indicative of the use of strategic choice and 
determinism, with respect to performance in an environment in which performance is mainly produced by chance 
or luck. For this reason, at this stage, the real-life existence of the hard incompatibilist perspective, although not 






4.1.3  Companies representative of the libertarian and compatibilist environments 
 
To look for empirical evidence of the existence of the libertarian and compatibilist environments, we collected 
data samples, to be analysed, from the NASDAQ stock exchange’s website, over a four-year period, using the 
theorical sampling theory presented above in section 4.1. Within a selected industry, companies were chosen that 
met a certain size criterion, which is coherent with the theoretical background, according to which companies’ 
activities should be of such a size to produce effects capable of influencing and shaping the external environment, 
which cannot always be said to be the case with smaller companies. 
Although, in performance measurement research, organizational size tends to be calculated as the logarithm 
of a firm’s assets (e.g. Ittner et al. 2003) or the logarithm of its revenues (e.g. Bushman et al. 1996; Gupta, 1987), 
and in the compensation literature it is common to find organizational size measured as a composite of 
organizational total assets, turnover and number of employees (e.g. Gomez-Mejia et al. 1987; Werner and Tosi, 
1995; Werner et al. 2005), for the NASDAQ’s publicly listed companies, market capitalization is a common 
criterion used for determining their size, such as in Forbes and other finance magazines. 
For the above reasons, in order to select an industry-representative sample, we chose a market capitalization 
threshold level of 10 billion USD, which corresponds to the NASDAQ’s threshold for defining Mega cap and 
Large cap companies, thus discarding Mid, Small, Micro and Nano cap companies.  
In the libertarian environment, according to the theoretical background, organizations should deal with 
uncertainty in the external environment by creating something new to their advantage, thus reducing uncertainty. 
This organizational behaviour can be expected in organizations which operate in the Technology industry, and its 
creation, promotion and distribution as shown in table 4.  
In the compatibilist ontological perspective, we look at a deterministic socio-economic environment in which 
the addition of strategic choice to management’s options creates the possibility of influencing and altering the 
external environment. According to this principle, the NASDAQ’s Public utilities and Consumer non-durable 
goods industries, which are described in Table 4, possess compatibilist features as, on the one hand, they provide 
a uniform and constant supply of goods and services, and on the other hand the processes used to obtain these 
goals can be altered and improved with the use of management strategic choice in promoting innovation. 
These samples of companies can be considered representative of all the industries in which they are active, to 
the extent the NASDAQ is considered to be representative of the whole market. 
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5  Empirical investigation of the libertarian and compatibilist perspectives  
 
In consideration of the fact that Zajac et al.’s, (2000) paper provides empirical evidence of the existence of the 
deterministic perspective and that it is not possible to quantitively analyse the hard incompatibilist environment 
we present the research hypothesis which will allow us to study the libertarian and the compatibilist environments. 
 
5.1  Research hypotheses 
 
When looking at how organizations are expected to behave in the compatibilist and libertarian ontological 
perspectives, it can be seen that both the literature and previous research suggest that: 
a) in the libertarian ontological perspective, organizations exploit their assets by creating something new, 
through innovation and its promotion, which is essential and constitutes the main driver of organizational 
performance (Kane 1999; Astley and Van de Ven 1983); 
b) in the compatibilist ontological perspective, organizations produce organizational performances through 
exploiting their assets by both adhering to the norm and using strategic choice to innovate and promote 




Fig. 7  Framework showing the effects of strategic choice on performance 
 
On the strength of these considerations and the strategic choice determinism framework, it is possible to 
highlight some of the latter’s features, as shown in Figure 7. This figure suggests the relationship between either 
strategic choice or determinism and organizational performance that we expect to identify through this empirical 
study, and enables us to generate the research hypotheses regarding the role strategic choice plays in producing 
sales and organizational performance, in both the libertarian and compatibilist ontological perspectives.  
 
5.2  Strategic choice and revenues in the libertarian real-life perspective  
 
As previously shown, the libertarian ontological perspective is uncertain by definition, until the agent shapes it to 
its advantage (Kane 1999). Environmental uncertainty therefore requires the use of strategic choice to 
continuously manage and harness the uncertain effects of the environment.  
These considerations indicate that, in the libertarian ontological perspective, in order to produce sales, 
organizations need to rely on the constant use of strategic-choice-based activities, consisting, for the purpose of 
this research, of at least innovation and its promotion, as was extensively shown in the theoretical background 
section. 
All of these activities rely on an underlying organizational structure represented by total assets, which could 
need to be modified as a result of the innovation process. 
In view of the preceding analysis, the following research hypothesis is proposed: 
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Hypothesis 1  In a libertarian ontological perspective, revenues are mainly dependent on the level of strategic-
choice-based activities (innovation and its promotion) carried out by the organization, and on total assets.  
 
5.3 Strategic choice and revenues in the compatibilist real-life ontological perspective  
 
In the compatibilist external environment, unlike in the libertarian ontological perspective, strategic choice and 
determinism coexist (Bourgeois, 1984), producing an environment that is partly determined and can produce some 
levels of organizational performance without the need for companies’ management to use any strategic choice. 
Therefore, in this environment, management uses strategic choice to increase or enhance performance that would 
otherwise still exist. The resulting research hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2  In a compatibilist ontological perspective, revenues are equally dependent on the level of 
strategic-choice-based activities (innovation and its promotion) carried out by the organization and on total assets. 
 
Strategic-choice-based activities play a less important role in explaining the revenues of companies operating 
in a compatibilist ontological perspective.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed by a lower dependence of revenues on strategic-choice-based activities 
and a stronger dependence of revenues on total assets than in the libertarian ontological perspective.  
 
5.4  Strategic choice and organizational performance in the libertarian perspective  
 
The dependence between strategic choice and revenues would also suggest that organizations’ performance 
indicators, such as EBITDA and ROA, which depend on revenues, should be related to the amount of strategic 
choice used by management. This should be the case within libertarian companies, to the extent that, if strategic 
choice were not used, these companies would either produce no performance or would produce it in a chance-
related way, thus moving organizations to the hard incompatibilist ontological perspective. In view of these 
considerations, we propose the following research hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3   The organizational performance of companies operating in a libertarian ontological perspective 
is more dependent on strategic-choice-based activities than total assets. 
 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by both a strong correlation between strategic-choice-based activities and 
organizational performance, and a regression that allows the prediction of performance as a function of the extent 
to which strategic choice is used. 
 
5.5 Strategic choice and organizational performance in the compatibilist perspective 
 
From the preceding analysis, it follows that total assets, which are the main deterministic component within a firm 
operating in the compatibilist ontological perspective, guarantee some level of performance regardless of the level 
of strategic choice used by management. However, if organizations used strategic choice, they could improve 
sales and therefore possibly overall performance. This leads to the following research hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4  The organizational performance of companies operating in a compatibilist ontological perspective 
is equally dependent on strategic-choice-based activities and on total assets. 
 
A correlation and a similar level of regression between the organizational performance variables and the 
variables of both strategic choice and determinism is expected.  
 
5.6 Strategic choice in the libertarian and compatibilist perspectives 
 
So far, it has been argued that organizations use strategic choice similarly in both the libertarian and compatibilist 
ontological perspectives; however, they produce different contextual outcomes according to the level of 
determinism that characterizes each ontological perspective. This assumption could be confirmed and validated, 
thus strengthening the strategic choice determinism framework, through empirical evidence showing that the use 
of strategic choice more strongly drives organizational performance in the libertarian than in the compatibilist 
ontological perspective. These considerations suggest the following research hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5 There is a stronger dependence between strategic-choice-based activities and revenues in a 
libertarian than in a compatibilist ontological perspective. 
 16 
Hypothesis 6 There is a weaker dependence between total assets and revenues in a libertarian than in a 
compatibilist ontological perspective. 
 
Hypothesis 7 There is a stronger dependence between strategic-choice-based activities and performance in a 
libertarian than in a compatibilist ontological perspective. 
 
Hypothesis 8 There is a weaker dependence between total assets and organizational performance in a libertarian 
than in a compatibilist ontological perspective. 
 
 
5.7  The Variables  
 
5.7.1 Independent variables 
 
Organizations actively influence and shape their environment with the use of tactics and strategies, which involve 
the use of marketing, target pricing, negotiation, coaptation, mergers, cooperation and lobbying (Schreyögg 1980). 
Similarly, Varadarajan et al. (1992) present non-deterministic, strategic-choice-based strategies, which rely on the 
creation of something new or the change of something existing within the socio-economic environment in which 
a company operates. 
Table 6 shows the strategic-choice-related activities suggested Schreyögg (1980) and Varadarajan et al. (1992) 
and links them to standard financial statement P&L cost entries. Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and 
Haynes and Hillman (2010) used the same financial statement cost entries, as a quantitative indication of 
management’s use of strategic choice, in their study of how board capital affects strategic change. 
To summarize, the literature shows that organizational management utilizes strategic-choice-based strategies 
to innovate, by spending on research and development (R&D), by promoting its results by spending on sales and 
marketing (S&M), or by spending on public relations and lobbying costs, which are accounted for in selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) financial statement cost entries.  
Together with variables which are indicative of strategic choice, there are variables which can deterministically 
influence organizational performance by constraining and also informing choice. Although De Rond and Thietart 
(2007) identify several variables as comprising the causal background, which includes management’s knowhow, 
competence, age, the organizational structure and the general state of the economy, in this study only total assets 
are used as an indication of how much a company relies on the deterministic aspects of its structure. Total assets 
is a significant value, reflecting both the capital employed (e.g. loans, shareholders’ capital, profit from previous 
years, etc.) and all the resources (tangible and intangible) an organization utilizes (e.g. equipment, properties, 
patents etc.) to pursue its strategic objectives. 
 
5.7.2 Dependent variables  
 
The impact of the use of strategic choice and determinism on organizations could be measured by identifying and 
measuring organizational performance indicator variations in search of a possible correlation with the variation in 
strategic choice and determinism. According to Gomez-Mejia et al. (1988) and Weiner and Mahoney (1981), 
organizational performance cannot be captured by a single measure but only by a host of different organizational 
performance indicators. As such, we use three different indicators, i.e. revenue, earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) and return on assets (ROA) (see Table 5 for variable definitions and 
Appendix A for descriptive statistics).  
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Table 5  Definitions of variables 
Variable Variable description 
(Values shown in the P&L of companies’ financial 
statements in millions of USD) 




R&D Describes innovation intensity: 




S&M Describes marketing and advertising intensity: 





SG&A Related to public relations, political influence and 
lobbying costs: 







Encompasses all the resources an organization utilizes to 
pursue its strategic objectives: 





REVENUE Sales for the year t: 






ROA Provides an indication of how much net income, shown 
as a percentage, organizational assets can produce: 






EBITDA EBITDA allows the evaluation of an organization’s 
ability to produce margins on revenues. EBITDA for the 
year t: 








The vector of our independent variables comprises indicators of costs related to strategic choice and 
determinism, such as R&D, S&M, SG&A and Total Assets. These variables are shown in the P&L of the 
companies’ financial statements in millions and indicate, in numerical form, the level of strategic-choice-based 
activities used by management during a particular year. Total Assets, which provides an indication of how much 
each company relies on deterministic planning, is a significant variable as it reflects both the capital employed 
(e.g. loans, shareholders’ capital, profit from previous years etc.), and all the resources (tangible and intangible) 
an organization utilizes (e.g. equipment, properties, patents etc.) to pursue its strategic objectives. 
 
5.7.3  Control variables 
 
According to Spector and Brannick (2013), control variables should be drawn from the theoretical background 
and collected together with the research data. The most meaningful and available control variable, with regard to 
our theoretical background, is organizational size, which in consideration of the kind of companies analysed in 
the samples, is measured by the companies’ capitalization, which is also used to select the companies for our 
samples.  
 
5.7.4  Initial qualitative evidence of the existence of the compatibilist and libertarian 
perspectives  
 
In the two compatibilist industry samples, only 14 companies out of 107 post R&D costs in their balance sheets. 
This shows that, as opposed to the libertarian ontological perspective, where all companies report R&D costs in 
their financial statements, in the compatibilist ontological perspective, only 12% of companies do it. This 
consideration alone, in a qualitative way, indicates that strategic-choice-based activities such as innovation and 





For the empirical investigation, a standard panel data analysis is utilized. Among the many different existing 
estimators, we opt for Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) as it provides consistent estimates and is capable 
of dealing with heteroskedastic and possibly serially correlated observations (Croissant and Millo 2008; 
Wooldridge, 2002).  As Croissant and Millo (2008) point out, general FGLS estimators are based on a two-step 
estimation process. First, an ordinary least square (OLS) model is estimated and produces 𝑢" it residuals. The 𝑢" it 
residuals are used to estimate an error covariance matrix, which is used to regress the variables’ variations from 
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their mean over time, within each company if effects=individuals is chosen, or across companies if effects=time 









n is the number of cases and u are the residuals. We use the Hausman test to choose whether the FGLS effects 
= individual model or the FGLS effects = time model better describes the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables and can be used to accept or reject the research hypotheses. As Croissant and Millo (2008) 
explain, the Hausman test indicates whether the two models are significantly different or not. If the two models 
were not significantly different, the model that explained the most variance would be chosen by looking at both 
the R2 and the mean of the error residual matrix and choosing the model that made them as close to zero as 
possible. If the two models were significantly different, the FGLS effects = individual would be chosen, as this 
model would guarantee maximum consistency (Wooldridge 2002). 
 
5.8.1 Models used to test the libertarian and compatibilist perspectives 
 
The regression between the dependent and independent variables is carried out utilizing the six linear models 
shown in Table 6, derived from the method presented above. 
 
Table 6  Regression research models 
 Compatibilist ontological perspective 
Model 1 Tests the dependence of revenues on R&D, SG&A and Total Assets 
Model 2 Tests the dependence of EBITDA on R&D, SG&A and Total Assets 
Model 3 Tests the dependence of ROA on R&D, SG&A and Total Assets 
 Libertarian ontological perspective 
Model 4 Tests the dependence of revenues on R&D, SG&A and Total Assets 
Model 5 Tests the dependence of EBITDA on R&D, SG&A and Total Assets 
Model 6 Tests the dependence of ROA on R&D, SG&A and Total Assets 
 
 
6  Results, evaluation and discussion 
 
The variables’ descriptive statistics indicate that the data are strongly heteroskedastic and the Pearson correlations 
show strong correlation between some of the variables. Table 7 presents the model results used to explore the 
libertarian and compatibilist ontological perspectives. In carrying out the analysis, FGLS models were used to test 
both the within individual effects and the between time effects variations, which produced similar results. 
 
Table 7  Regression results for the libertarian and compatibilist ontological perspective 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Compatibilist revenues Compatibilist EBITDA Compatibilist ROA 
Beta Std. error Beta Std. error Beta Std. error 
R&D    0.019342 0.039594    0.0085368   0.0331642   -2.6559e-04   2.3951e-04 
SGA 0.288570***  0.050727 -0.1297523*** 0.0337505 1.1326e-05   2.2599e-04   
Total assets 0.184755***  0.015516 0.0949460*** 0.0110027 2.8757e-05   8.1206e-05 
  R-squared: 0.99 R-squared: 0.96 R-squared:0.76 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Libertarian revenues Libertarian EBITDA Libertarian ROA 
Beta Std. error Beta Std. error Beta Std. error 
R&D 2.030113** 0.750755   -0.588740    0.391113 5.6364e-04   1.8209e-03 
SGA   2.543608*** 0.503270    0.073621    0.312012   -5.4387e-04   1.3119e-03 
Total assets   0.205598*** 0.037745  0.166863*** 0.019387   -3.6749e-05   9.1900e-05 
  R-squared: 0.99   R-squared: 0.97152 R-squared: 0.74185 
 *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.  
Note: The variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all estimated models are below 5, indicating that multicollinearity has 
been kept to its minimum (the correlation matrix and the VIFs have been left out for economy of space but are available 
upon request). The descriptive statistics of the variables used are given in Table 9 in the appendix. 
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The analysis is therefore based on the within variation model as it is known to produce more consistent results. 
Notwithstanding the FGLS regression consistency, even in the presence of high heteroskedasticity in the sample 
data or a non-constant variance across the dependent and independent variables, to further test the model 
robustness, the following methods were also applied to normalize the data: 
1) reduction to a percentage of the maximum observed value for each variable; 
2) log reduction of data to produce a normally distributed variable data histogram; 
3) distribution improvement by replacing outliers more than three standard deviations away from the mean, 
with values contained within three standard deviations from the mean in each direction. 
The six models, after each of the above normalization processes, produced similar results, guaranteeing high 
consistency of research results notwithstanding the high heteroskedasticity of the collected data. 
 
Table 8  Summary of interpretation of results with respect to research hypotheses  
Hypotheses Regression results interpretation 
Hypothesis 1 In a libertarian 
ontological perspective, revenues are 
mainly dependent on the level of 
strategic-choice-based activities 
(innovation and its promotion) carried 
out by the organization, and on total 
assets. 
Model 4 shows that, in the libertarian ontological perspective 
(Hypothesis 1), R&D and SG&A positively contribute to yearly 
revenues, with beta coefficients of respectively 2 and 2.5.  
This means that, for every billion USD spent on R&D and SG&A, 
revenues will increase by respectively 2 and 2.5 billion. In the same 
model, the role of Total Assets is marginal, since it increases with a 
beta coefficient of 0.2, contributing less than a tenth to the increase 
in revenues compared to strategic-choice-based activities.  
These facts suggest that, in the libertarian ontological perspective, 
revenues are driven and produced by strategic-choice-based 
activities, which activate Total Assets, which by themselves could 
not produce revenues. 
Hypothesis 2  In a compatibilist 
ontological perspective, revenues are 
equally dependent on the level of 
strategic-choice-based activities 
(innovation and its promotion) carried 
out by the organization and on total 
assets. 
Model 1 shows that, in the compatibilist ontological perspective 
(Hypothesis 2), the dependence on strategic choice is limited to 
SG&A, since R&D does not explain revenues. Total Assets 
contribute similarly to SG&A in explaining revenues, with similarly 
small beta coefficients of respectively 0.18 and 0.28, thus supporting 
research Hypothesis H2. 
Hypothesis 3 The organizational 
performance of companies operating in 
a libertarian ontological perspective is 
more dependent on strategic-choice-
based activities than total assets. 
Model 5 shows that Total Assets explain EBITDA for the libertarian 
ontological perspective whilst model 6 did not produce significant 
results. 
Hypothesis 4 The organizational 
performance of companies operating in 
a compatibilist ontological perspective 
is equally dependent on strategic-
choice-based activities and on total 
assets. 
Model 2 suggests that Total Assets explain EBITDA for the 
libertarian ontological perspective whilst model 3 failed to produce 
significant results. 
Hypothesis 5 There is a stronger 
dependence between strategic-choice-
based activities and revenues in a 
libertarian than in a compatibilist 
ontological perspective. 
The comparison of Models 1 and 4 shows that revenues are mainly 
produced, in a libertarian ontological perspective, by strategic-
choice-based activities, while in the compatibilist ontological 
perspective they are equally produced by SG&A and Total Assets. 
Hypothesis 6 There is a weaker 
dependence between total assets and 
revenues in a libertarian than in a 
compatibilist ontological perspective. 
The role of strategic-choice-based activities is greatly reduced in 
the compatibilist ontological perspective for two reasons: only 
SG&A contributes to produce sales, and its contribution comes 
with a beta coefficient of 0.18 as opposed to 2.5 in the libertarian 
ontological perspective. 
Hypothesis  7  There is a stronger 
dependence between strategic-choice-
based activities and performance in a 
libertarian than in a compatibilist 
ontological perspective. 
The research results do not support Hypothesis 7 as none of models 
2, 3, 5 and 6 show any correlation between EBITDA, ROA and 
strategic-choice-based activities. 
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Hypothesis 8 There is a weaker 
dependence between total assets and 
organizational performance in a 
libertarian than in a compatibilist 
ontological perspective. 
The comparison between models 2 and 5 indicates that, in the 
compatibilist ontological perspective, a greater level of Total 
Assets is needed to obtain EBITDA, similarly to in the libertarian 
ontological perspective, thus supporting the research hypothesis. 
 
On the basis of the results obtained, the research hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8 are confirmed, indicating that 
revenue, in the libertarian ontological perspective, depends on strategic-choice-based activities and Total Assets. 
The results also suggest that, in the compatibilist ontological perspective, revenue depends on strategic-choice-
based activities and Total Assets, although the regression coefficient suggests that strategic choice’s impact on 
the dependent variable is rather less pronounced. These findings confirm the validity of the strategic choice 
determinism framework for the revenue performance variable in the libertarian and compatibilist ontological 
perspectives.  
As far as the research hypotheses 3, 4 and 7 are concerned, the estimates produced no supporting evidence. 
I.e., either EBITDA or ROA does not depend on strategic-choice-based activities or on determinism when ROA 
is considered (see Table 8, for further elaboration on the implication of these results). 
Considering that revenues are an important performance indicator and can be considered the organizational 
outcome produced by the use of strategic choice and determinism, companies’ revenues’ dependence on strategic 
choice, in the libertarian ontological perspective, and on both strategic choice and determinism in the compatibilist 
ontological perspective, is sufficient to confirm the validity of the strategic choice/determinism framework for the 
libertarian and compatibilist ontological perspectives.  
The fact that most of the compatibilist NASDAQ sample of utilities and consumers’ non-durable goods 
companies, whose capitalization represents more than 70% of their industries, do not report R&D costs on their 
financial statement, unlike the libertarian technology companies, shows that strategic choice is not the main driver 
of revenues in the compatibilist ontological perspective, and provides qualitative empirical evidence of the general 
validity of the strategic choice/determinism framework. 
However, the rejection of hypotheses 3, 4 and 7, which imply the existence of a relationship between the 
strategic choice R&D and SG&A and the deterministic Total Assets variables and the performance variables of 
EBITDA and ROA, with the exception of EBITDA, which only depends on Total Assets, was totally unexpected. 
Having taken into account Zajac et al.’s (2000) results, it was expected that, for the libertarian and compatibilist 
ontological perspectives, ROA could be somewhat related to the intensity with which either strategic choice or 
determinism are used in strategic management.  
In view of the preceding results, it can be deduced that the study by Zajac et al. (2000), for the deterministic 
ontological perspective (S&L industry), the NASDAQ technology industries for the libertarian ontological 
perspective, and the utilities and non-durable goods industries for the compatibilist ontological perspective, 
suggests that companies produce revenues, with a different use of strategic choice and determinism according to 
the ontological perspective in which they operate. However, other important performance indicators, such as 
EBITDA and ROA, only appear to be related to deterministic independent variables, in the deterministic 
ontological perspective, while in both the libertarian and compatibilist ontological perspectives, EBITDA depends 
on Total Assets only, and ROA depends on neither Total Assets nor strategic-choice-based activities nor revenues. 
 
 
6.1  Contribution to theory  
 
On the strength of the theoretical and empirical considerations that have been made up to now, the strategic 
choice/determinism framework makes the following main contributions to theory: 
The framework reduces theoretical fragmentation as it connects the philosophical human agency and strategic 
management fields, and also justifies the existence of multiple strategic management theories. Although both 
Marquis and Tilcsik (2013), supporters of imprinting, and Sydow et al. (2009) - advocates of the organizational 
path theory, see imprinting as the result of a deterministic process, while they look on organizational path 
dependence as the result of a random event and therefore claim that the two theories are distinct and different, 
Sydow et al. (2009) concede that “imprinting can explain the path restriction in the preformation phase” (p.686). 
The above suggests that imprinting constitutes at least one of the possible paths foreseen by organizational path 
theory, thus suggesting that the two theories should be part of a more holistic theoretical framework, in which 
imprinting is a mechanism of the organizational path dependence theory.  
Figure 8 indicates how authors of different economic theories were all looking at different aspects of the same 
reality. The fact that the use of free will in human agency and strategic choice in strategic management implies 
the creation of something new, from which both the human agent and the organization can respectively benefit, 
highlights a theoretical link between strategic choice and innovation, which, for the libertarian and compatibilist 
perspectives, becomes the expected outcome of the use of strategic choice. 
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The strategic choice determinism framework shows that the resource-based view (RBV) can be considered 
accurate only for the deterministic ontological perspective, while in the compatibilist or libertarian ontological 
perspective, performance can only be respectively improved or achieved by adding strategic-choice-based 
activities to the possession or exploitation of assets. In this context, Zailani et al. (2017)’s study in support of the 
RBV view, suggests that companies produce performance by resorting to internal logistics resources when in 




Fig. 8  The links between the fields of human agency and strategic management 
 
In addition, this framework complements and effectively expands Porter’s Five Forces approach by showing 
that there is not only a deterministic approach to planning but also the compatibilist and libertarian ontological 
perspectives, in which strategic choice and innovation are not a threat but essential to attaining organizational 
performance. 
Porter’s framework, in fact, presents innovation and anything new as a threat of substitutes and threat of new 
entrants, suggesting to managers that they should pursue the status quo by erecting barriers or creating 
contingencies against innovation and anything new, and discouraging companies from taking advantage of the 
opportunities generated by the use of strategic choice and innovation.  
The strategic choice and determinism framework also supports the existence of the four “paradigms” or 
clusters of assumptions of functionalist, interpretivist, radical structuralist and radical humanist, identified by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979, pp.21-25) and Joullié (2018), that frame management and organizational research. 
Each of these clusters is characterized by a different level of strategic choice that managers use and determinism 
that they rely on, thus creating theories and planning tools which are performative (allow prediction of future 
events) within the functionalist and radical structuralist clusters, and are difficult to identify or are undetermined 
in the postmodern interpretivist and radical humanist clusters. 
The contrasting features of these research environments and the limited or uncertain validity of the 
management theories applicable to each of them brings Joullié (2018) to conclude that the elusiveness of a single 
and comprehensive theory of management is related to human individuals being free and not abiding by 
psychological determinism, on which deterministic theories rely, and that the quest for a theory of management 
should be abandoned in favour of management history, which should serve as a reference for future managers. 
However, the awareness of the existence of the strategic choice determinism framework provides strength and 
validity to the theories and planning tools which are valid within each non-exclusive perspective of the framework. 
Managers can therefore rely upon these planning tools as long as they take into account each theory-specific 
environmental-validity boundary. 
The strategic choice determinism framework helps to explain the existence of organizational contrasting 
strategies such as long-term	versus	short-term,	innovation	versus	tradition,	and	stability	versus	change as 
shown by Karhu and Ritala (2020). These apparently irreconcilable organizational strategies, whose contrast can 
be related to a different use of strategic choice and determinism, are, in reality, organizational conditions whose 
existence is predicted by the framework. In fact, empirical data shows that managers use different levels of 




6.2  Contribution to practice 
The practical implications of the empirical validity of the strategic choice determinism framework could be of 
paramount importance for real-life companies as the preceding analysis suggests the following: 
• The ontological perspectives the framework describes apply to different aspects of organizational life, 
thus connecting real-life decision making to the continuing and live philosophical debate about free will 
and determinism. 
• The strategic choice determinism framework clearly shows the link between strategic choice and 
innovation, and highlights its importance in each of the ontological perspectives, according to how much 
strategic choice is available to management. The use that management makes of innovation can be 
revealed by how much a company spends on R&D and on the related marketing activities used to promote 
it. As shown by Ou Yang et al. (2019) the greater the market uncertainty the fastest managers bring new 
products to market. 
• The strategic choice/determinism framework can help management, at a practical level, by indicating to 
companies what use they should make of strategic choice and determinism in order to produce 
organizational performance, according to the ontological perspective in which they operate. This 
consideration helps management to make the most effective choice between the contrasting business 
strategies of long-term	versus	short-term,	innovation	versus	tradition,	and	stability	versus	change 
presented by (Karhu and Ritala, 2020). 
• Organizational path dependence and imprinting theories can help to map the part of the path as well as 
perspective in which a company is located, and in which direction it is going, thus providing practical 
suggestions drawn from theory on how to reach strategic objectives. 
• If we consider that a company, operating in the deterministic perspective by knowing and applying the 
laws and rules of the environment, can rely on expected performance, and similarly that a company which 
operates in the libertarian perspective knows it has to use strategic choice in order to produce 
performance, we can understand how the strategic choice determinism framework can help to reduce 
uncertainty in planning. 
On the whole, one of the main features of the strategic choice determinism framework is that it highlights the 
importance of strategic choice and its importance in planning, as opposed to all the major planning theories (i.e. 
contingency theory, the RBV, Porter’s Five Forces, etc.) which only focus on the deterministic aspects of planning. 
The strategic choice determinism framework points out, in a way no other theory has done before, and in addition 
to the traditionally known deterministic approach to planning, the importance of strategic choice, as the framework 
enables us to position each organization in a particular perspective, by identifying how much it relies either on 
strategic choice and/or on determinism. 
 
 
7  Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we argue that there is a link between the human agency variables of free will and determinism, and 
the strategic management variables of strategic choice and socio-economic determinism, and that each pair of 
variables creates a space or framework, which identifies the four human agency ontological perspectives of 
determinism, hard incompatibilism, libertarianism and compatibilism. We call the framework, identified by 
strategic choice and socio-economic determinism, the strategic choice determinism framework. 
We then provide evidence of the framework’s real-life existence, awareness of which can also help 
management to both identify the most appropriate economic theories, which suggest the use of different amounts 
of strategic choice and determinism, that apply to each environment, in order to produce performance, and draw 
useful conclusions rooted in the philosophical context of human agency, thanks to the link that connects it to 
strategic management.  
At a theoretical level, the framework reduces theoretical fragmentation and helps to justify the existence of, 
and to frame, existing economic theories according to the amount of strategic choice and socio-economic 
determinism upon which they rely within each of the framework’s perspectives. This consideration explains the 
elusiveness of the search for a single theory of management and suggests that existing management theories can 
be reliably used within the boundaries of the environment in which they are valid. 
 
7.1 Limitations and future directions  
The research results presented in this paper may be affected by the following limitations:  
a) Possible partiality of variables as the examined strategic choice and determinism independent variables of 
R&D, SG&A and Total Assets may only be some of the variables which indicate the use of strategic choice and 
determinism within a company.  
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b) Possible incoherence of variables since SG&A was used as a proxy for strategic choice because it usually 
includes the strategic-choice-indicative activities of marketing and advertising. Some companies, however, may 
have posted marketing and advertising costs in their financial statements separately from SG&A and included in 
it many other expenses unrelated to strategic choice, which could override strategic-choice-based activities.  
c) Some companies might put strategic-choice-based activities costs in different company statement entries, 
thereby possibly creating unreliable results.  
d) The compatibilist and libertarian company samples were observed over a limited time span of four years. 
Over a longer time period, these samples could produce different results.  
e) The limited number of MEGA companies, with a capitalization greater than 10 billion USD, which 
constitute the samples studied, may reduce the representativeness of the industry samples, creating the risk of 
inconsistent results. 
Some possible directions for future research could include the investigation of the relationship between 
financial statement factors, such as cost of sales, taxes and capital structure as shown by Hoffmann (2014), which 
may vary from company to company, in the deterministic, libertarian and compatibilist industries, and 
performance. Future research could also enhance our knowledge of the role that strategic choice and determinism 
play in determining organizations’ internal environments, thus affecting, as the research has shown, performance 
indicators. Future research could also investigate a more diverse sample of companies from platforms other than 
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Appendix A  
Table 1 Dependent and independent variables’ descriptive statistics) 
 Compatibilist perspective 
 Revenue EBITA ROA R&D SG&A Total 
Assets 
Mean 18821 4176 2.338 2163 4003.4 34369 
St.dev. 25135.02 6889.63 20.92 13121.12 7843.58 49978.52 
Min 0 -3219 -237.6 0 0 0 
Max 132447 50112 37.1 127000 46869 292829 
 Libertarian perspective 
 Revenue EBITA ROA R&D SG&A Total 
Assets 
Mean 16256 4328.9 6.816 1482.8 2612 24376 
St.dev. 30374.67 9228.57 11.24 2236.12 4557.911 39101.11 
Min 24 -6838 -58 4 6 0 
Max 182795 61429 36 11381 22680 231839 
 
 
